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ABSTRACT
There is increased emphasis on donor engagement in the world’s poorest and most fragile states,
but aid modalities tend to diﬀer depending on the recipient countries’ governance. In fragile states,
donors often bypass governments and collaborate with non-state development actors (NGOs) to
prevent aid capture, improve eﬀective delivery and increase eﬀectiveness. Based on
ethnographic ﬁeldwork over 20 months in 2009–2012, the aim of this paper is to explore the
role of NGOs in community-based primary healthcare vis-à-vis the Ministry of Health in Guinea-
Bissau. Revitalization of Guinea-Bissau’s formerly extensive community healthcare services was
initiated in 2010. The Ministry of Health, in charge of its implementation, emphasized ownership,
harmonization and alignment that created tension with NGOs. However, as a result of a military
coup in 2012, donors bypassed the Ministry and gave NGOs a central role. Through the voices of
stakeholders, this paper outlines donors’ dilemmas in a situation of state fragility. They found
NGO-ization reasonable to protect funds and secure implementation while some worried that it
might counteract alignment, harmonization, ownership and sustainability. The paper argues that
aid to the health sector in fragile states needs to be long-term and predictable.
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Introduction
In the late 1990s, good governance was assumed to be a
prerequisite for eﬀective aid (Burnside and Dollar 1997;
World Bank 1998). However, attention was called to the
risk that giving priority to a country’s performance over
need would result in exclusion of the poorest and most
conﬂict-prone countries from assistance (Overseas
Development Institute 1998). During this period,
countries characterized by political instability, conﬂict
and extremely low income were given the denomination
‘diﬃcult partnership countries,’ ‘fragile states’ and ‘failed
states.’ This had a negative impact on aid to these
countries and some gained a status as ‘aid orphans’
(Einarsdóttir 2007; Dietrich 2013; Levin and Dollar 2005).
At the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century, Radelet
argued that countries with bad governance ‘should not
only receive less money, but they should also receive
more of it as project aid, it should come with a shorter
time commitment, and much of it should be distributed
through NGOs’ (2004, 18). While some practitioners and
scholars increasingly argue for donor engagement in
the world’s poorest and most fragile states the
methods of aid delivery diﬀer depending on the recipi-
ent countries’ governance (Acht, Mahmoud, and Thiele
2014, 2015; Dietrich 2016, 2013). Donors tend to
bypass the government in countries with inadequate
governance and, instead, collaborate with non-state
development partners such as international and local
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international
organizations and private companies. This tactic, Dietrich
(2013, 2016) argues, aims to prevent aid capture,
improve eﬀective aid delivery and thereby increase aid
eﬀectiveness. Dietrich (2016) found that donors that
use bypass tactics may be more successful in providing
immediate relief to the poor through easily implementa-
ble health interventions as compared to donors that
focus on the building of institutions in collaboration
with the recipient government. Yet, Dietrich argues
that bypassing the government can undermine long-
term eﬀorts to build up a state that can manage its
own development.
Increased ‘NGO-ization’ of aid has its roots in neolib-
eral aid policy in the 1980s, when NGOs, being non-state
actors, became favored by donors to deliver services
mainly within the social sector (Banks and Hulme
2012). Thus, there was a burgeoning of NGOs, both
national and international ones, that later found a role
within whatever policy trend that followed, such as the
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post-Washington consensus, good governance, poverty
reduction, and the Paris Declaration (Banks, Hulme, and
Edwards 2015). Donors often take NGOs to be more
eﬃcient, eﬀective, ﬂexible and innovative as compared
to recipient governments (Brass 2012; Doyle and Patel
2008). NGOs are assumed to show more compassion
and be more committed to democracy and promotion
of participatory development, in addition to being seen
as more accountable and transparent than governments
(Brass 2012; Doyle and Patel 2008; Pfeiﬀer 2003).
NGOs have also been criticized. Involvement of NGOs
can lead to increased fragmentation of aid activities, lack
of coordination and inadequate management (Pfeiﬀer
2003; Buse and Walt 1996; Gideon and Porter 2016). In
post-conﬂict states, formal institutions may suﬀer from
donors’ reliance on NGOs, as they, at times, run parallel
services that undermine the services of the state, and
they also compete with the state for funding and compe-
tent staﬀ (Aman and Aman 2014). NGOs often oﬀer local
health workers higher salaries than government health
facilities which results in a brain-drain from the public
to the NGO sector (Witter et al. 2017). NGOs tend to
have a short time frame for projects, and their assistance
is not as stable as that of bilateral donors (Baldursdóttir
2018; Bhutta et al. 2010; Chilundo et al. 2015; Pfeiﬀer
2003). Also, since NGOs tend to work in more aﬄuent
areas and group together, they may contribute to geo-
graphical inequalities in service delivery with speciﬁc
areas and populations targeted more than others (Buse
and Walt 1996). Dependent on donor funding, NGOs
may further emphasise their own or their sponsor’s pre-
ferences instead of local priorities which can aﬀect local
budgetary and policy processes. Hearn (1998), who ques-
tioned the comparative advantage of NGOs, points out
that the process of NGO-ization is not based on the prin-
ciple of sustainability and can lead to externally oriented
and highly dependent health services. She argues that
NGO-ization involves ‘western sponsorships of private
voluntary organisations in order for them to play an
increasingly pivotal role in the economic, social and pol-
itical life of the country’ (89) and that it can be under-
stood as an attempt at social engineering undertaken
by western donors. In her eﬀorts to understand the pos-
ition of local NGOs in Africa, Hearn (2007) is tempted to
see these as merely managers of foreign aid rather than
promoters of locally rooted development.
Despite criticism of NGOs, many donors and inter-
national organizations assume NGOs have a comparative
advantage in the delivery of health interventions (Doyle
and Patel 2008). Already in the 1980s, as a response to an
increased number and diversity of donor agencies and
NGOs active within the health sector of aid recipient
countries, coordination of aid entered the agenda
(Buse and Walt 1997). Development practice within
health, as well as in other sectors, was in need of coordi-
nation to enhance aid eﬀectiveness (Buse and Walt 1996,
1997; Walt et al. 1999), and contributed to the adoption
of the Paris Declaration on Aid Eﬀectiveness in 2005
(Sundewall 2009). The Paris Declaration rests on ﬁve prin-
ciples, including ownership, alignment, harmonization,
managing for results and mutual accountability that reci-
pient countries and donors are expected to follow (OECD
2005). Aid delivered in line with these principles was
assumed to be more eﬀective and contribute to
improved development outcomes and increased owner-
ship of the recipient countries. The principles of the
Declaration also aimed to address problems caused by
multiple non-aligned NGO-funded projects that were
outside governmental control and, at times, unknown
to national authorities (Mawdsley, Savage, and Kim
2014; Taylor et al. 2013). A case in point is projects
within the health sector (Sundewall 2009; Sundewall
et al. 2009), and foreign aid to community-based
primary healthcare (PHC) has been and still is channelled
through NGOs and their expatriate technical experts (Bal-
dursdóttir 2018; Bhutta et al. 2010; Chilundo et al. 2015;
Pfeiﬀer 2003).
During the last decade, the revitalization of health
work inspired by the Alma Ata Declaration and its
emphasis on PHC adopted in 1978 entered the global
agenda (WHO 2008). PHC was considered to be a way
to reach the health-related Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) and is now believed to have a central
role in the achievement of the Sustainable Development
Goals (Bhutta 2017; Lawn et al. 2008). The Alma Ata
Declaration reaﬃrmed that health is a fundamental
human right to which all people are entitled, enshrined
in its slogan ‘Health-for-All by the Year 2000’ (WHO
1978). The concept of PHC, as outlined in the Declaration,
includes three dimensions of a well-functioning health
system: health services, supportive functions, and com-
munity participation, equity and intersectoral engage-
ment. The oﬃcial healthcare policy of the newly
independent Guinea-Bissau was under inﬂuence of the
ideology that was laid out in the Alma Ata Declaration.
In 1977, the Ministry of Health launched a community
health program with ﬁnancial and technical support
from bilateral donors, or NGOs in close collaboration
with bilateral donors (Baldursdóttir 2018; Chabot and
Waddington 1987). Faith-based organizations (FBO)
were also involved in community health but limited to
speciﬁc activities, such as growth monitoring and vacci-
nation. The community was to participate in the con-
struction of a village health unit and to choose
community members they trusted to work as volunteers
with two distinct functions. Community Health Workers
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(CHWs) received training in ﬁrst aid and treatment of the
most common diseases, in addition to preventive activi-
ties such as health education and vaccinations. Tra-
ditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) were trained in
antenatal care, how to assist women to give birth and
how to identify risk pregnancies in need of referral to
health centres (Baldursdóttir 2018; Einarsdóttir and
Gunnlaugsson 2009; and Gunnlaugsson 2007).
After an initial period of expansion of the community
health services, there was a period of degradation follow-
ing cuts in aid to Guinea-Bissau, new priorities in the
health policies among donors and a military uprising in
1998–1999 (Baldursdóttir 2018). However, following the
global calls for revitalization of PHC (WHO 2008), in
2010–2011 a new community health policy was elabo-
rated for Guinea-Bissau. In line with the global agenda,
CHWs were to be trained, and paid workers and TBAs
were excluded from the community healthcare (Singh
and Sachs 2013; The Lancet Global Health 2017). The
CHWs should engage more in preventive work than for-
merly and they should encourage pregnant women and
other patients to seek care at health facilities. Yet, due to
political turbulence, and contrary to the initial intention
of the Ministry of Health, NGOs operating in Guinea-
Bissau became inﬂuential actors in the implementation
of the new policy.
In this article, we aim to explore the views of donor
representatives, international and national NGO
workers, Ministry of Health oﬃcials and local health pro-
fessionals on the role of NGOs in community-based PHC
vis-à-vis the Ministry of Health in Guinea-Bissau, a fragile
sub-Saharan state. The focus is on the revitalization of
community healthcare following renewed global interest
in PHC, and the interplay between NGOs and the Ministry
of Health. The article starts with a description of the
study context and the methodology used. The main
ﬁndings are then presented with a focus on the revitali-
zation of community healthcare initiated in 2010 and the
subsequent time of tension between the Ministry of
Health and NGOs. The eﬀect of the political crisis in
2012 is then discussed and the consequent NGO-
ization of community healthcare. Finally, the ﬁndings
are discussed and conclusions are drawn.
Study context
The Republic of Guinea-Bissau is a small coastal West
African state that gained independence from Portugal
in 1973/1974 after eleven years of liberation war (Shaw
2015). The population is approximately 1,844,000
(UNDP 2016); in 2010, it was estimated that 69 percent
of the population lived in poverty (deﬁned as living on
less than 2 USD a day), and thereof 33 percent in
extreme poverty (less than 1 USD a day) (Abreu 2013,
627). In line with this, the country’s social and human
development indicators are among the lowest in the
world; the UN Development Program ranked Guinea-
Bissau 178 out of 188 countries in the 2016 Human
Development Index (UNDP 2016), and on the Healthcare
Access and Quality Index it ranked 193 out of 195
countries (Fullman et al. 2018). Since the late 1990s,
the country has been referred to as a diﬃcult partnership
country, failed state, fragile state, aid orphan and narco-
state (Einarsdóttir 2007, 2011; Shaw 2015; Vigh 2017).
On 7 June 1998, there was a military uprising with
ensuing war that lasted for almost a year (Einarsdóttir
2007; Temudo 2008; Vigh 2006). Shortly before the war,
the country saw a rapid decline in development assistance;
from 180 million USD in 1996 to 124 million USD in 1997
and 1998, the year the war broke out, it was reduced to
96 million USD and 52 million USD in 1999 (Einarsdóttir
2007, 102). In the ﬁrst decade after the military conﬂict,
there were some failed and violently suppressed coup
attempts, several changes of government, and continuous
military interventions in politics (Embaló 2012; Shaw 2015).
At thebeginningofMarch 2009, President Vieira (Nino)was
brutally assassinated by armedmilitaries following a bomb
explosion a few hours earlier that killed the Chief of Staﬀ of
the army, General Baptista TagmeNaWaie. Thesemurders
are believed to have been the result of an escalation of
competition over the traﬃcking of drugs from South
America in which both Vieira and Na Waie were allegedly
involved (Embaló 2012; Shaw 2015; Vigh 2017). In 2010,
there was a failed military coup but two years later, on 12
April 2012, there was a successful one. A transitional gov-
ernment was appointed, but it was rejected by the inter-
national community and sharply criticized for being too
lenient towards the coup perpetrators (EIU 2012; Inter-
national Crisis Group 2012; Kohl 2013). As a result, aid to
Guinea-Bissau plummeted from 121,010,000 USD in 2011
to 79,660,000USD in 2012 (World Bank 2017). Despite elec-
tions in 2014, the political situation is still turbulent (Secur-
ity Council 2017).
In Guinea-Bissau, the Ministry of Health is responsible
for coordinating the healthcare system that is organized
on three levels. At the local level, there are three types of
health centres categorized according to their capacity,
and a community healthcare component. At the regional
level, there are ﬁve regional hospitals situated in Bafatá,
Canchungo, Catió, Gabú and Mansoa. At the central level,
there is a national hospital, Simão Mendes, in Bissau
(Einarsdóttir and Baldursdóttir 2011; Ministério da
Saúde Pública 2008). There is a private for-proﬁt sector,
situated mainly in Bissau, and a non-proﬁt private
sector that includes FBOs and national and international
NGOs (Ministério da Saúde Pública 2008). At all levels of
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES RESEARCH S29
the healthcare system, there is a shortage of staﬀ (Russo
et al. 2017; Tyrrell et al. 2010; UNIOGBIS-HRS/OHCHR
2017). Accessibility to facilities is aﬀected by distance,
poverty and lack of transport (Einarsdóttir and Baldurs-
dóttir 2011; UNIOGBIS-HRS/OHCHR 2017). Many health
facilities remain at a signiﬁcant distance from the popu-
lation they serve; in 2008 it was estimated that 40
percent of the population lived more than ﬁve kilometers
away from the nearest health facility (Ministério da Saúde
Pública 2008). However, there is signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between regions in the average distance to health facili-
ties. Access to ambulance transportation is often unreli-
able, and patients need to pay for fuel (Einarsdóttir and
Baldursdóttir 2011; UNIOGBIS-HRS/OHCHR 2017).
Government expenditure on healthcare is low or 5.18
percent of the government budget, and the remainder of
health funding comes from user fees and donors (UNIOG-
BIS-HRS/OHCHR 2017). In 2014, the general government
expenditure on healthcare was 20 percent of the total
costs and out-of-pocket fees represented 62 percent of
private contributions (WHO 2016). A World Bank Health
Sector Review conducted in 2016 found that Guinea-
Bissau had the highest out-of-pocket payment rates in
West Africa (quoted in UNIOGBIS-HRS/OHCHR 2017). At
the same time, a recent analysis of conditionalities of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the period 1995–
2014 in 16 West African countries, including Guinea-
Bissau, found those to have contributed to reduced ﬁscal
space for the governments to invest in their national
health systems, including increased numbers of doctors
and nurses (Stubbs et al. 2017). Donor-ﬁnanced programs
are thus crucial for the national health services (Ministério
da Saúde Pública 2008), although the political instability
has aﬀected donor resources to healthcare provision. Tra-
ditionally, NGOs and FBOs have played an essential role
in health service delivery, as bilateral agencies have had a
limited interest in collaborating with successive govern-
ments (Russo et al. 2017).
Following independence, the community health
program experienced rapid expansion and consolidation,
and was, by community members and health oﬃcials
alike, considered to have functioned well, albeit not
without problems (Baldursdóttir 2018). In the wake of
the military uprising in 1998–1999, this expansive period
was followed by a decade of degradation. In 2009–2010,
the services were functioning with diﬃculties and lacked
funding. However, the program received some ﬁnancial
and technical assistance. The main donors of ﬁnancial
support were UNICEF, the Global Fund, UNFPA, EU and
WHO. The international NGOs working in community
healthcare included the Portuguese NGOs VIDA, Assistên-
cia Médica Internacional (AMI), Saúde em Português and
Médicos del Mundo, the Spanish NGO Asamblea de
Cooperación por la Paz (ACPP) and Plan International.
There were also some national NGOs, including Alternag,
Divutec, EAPP and Parakaten, that worked on the
implementation of community healthcare in collaboration
with international NGOs and donors. The EU, the Portu-
guese Institute for Development Assistance (IPAD), the
Spanish Agency for International Development
Cooperation (AECID) and private actors from these
countries were the primary funders of the NGOs. As
before, FBOs worked with community healthcare, focus-
ing on growth monitoring and vaccinations. Also, UK
based Eﬀective Intervention was implementing a research
project in two regions with the aim of lowering child mor-
tality through community health interventions (Boone
et al. 2016; King, Mann, and Boone 2010; Mann et al. 2009).
Methods
Anthropological ﬁeldwork1 was conducted during two
periods; ﬁrst for 18 months from July 2009 to May 2011
and then two months at the end of 2012. This paper is
mainly based on semi-structured interviews in Bissau
with eight representatives of international organizations,
eleven representatives of local and international NGOs
and ﬁve staﬀ members at the Ministry of Health. Data
were also collected through participant observation at
two stakeholder meetings at the Ministry of Health.
During the revisit in 2012, semi-structured interviews
were conducted in Bissau with ﬁve representatives of
international organizations, six representatives of local
and international NGOs, and four staﬀ members at the
Ministry of Health. Also, participant observation was
carried out during two monthly meetings with CHWs
within a pilot project in one region. The data collected
during ﬁeldwork was continuously transcribed and ana-
lyzed, and the ﬁnal thematic analysis was done with
the qualitative program Atlas.ti used for coding of inter-
views and ﬁeld notes (Friese 2014).
The Ministry of Health in Guinea-Bissau was contacted
for collaboration and ethical approval. The research was
open, and informed consent was obtained from partici-
pants at all times. Before asking for permission to
record each interview, all participants in the study were
informed about the aims of the research. They were
also informed that the interview was conﬁdential and
that they could stop at any point.
Findings
This section describes the revitalization of community
healthcare in Guinea-Bissau that was initiated in 2010,
the tension it created between the Ministry of Health and
NGOs, and the consequences of the military coup in 2012.
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Revitalization of community healthcare
At the end of 2010, the international interest to revitalize
community-based PHC, in the spirit of Alma Ata, became
evident in Guinea-Bissau when the Ministry of Health
organized a two-day meeting, referred to as Days of
Reﬂection. UNICEF ﬁnanced the meeting and provided
technical assistance. The stated aim of the meeting was
for diﬀerent stakeholders to meet and discuss the
current situation of community healthcare in Guinea-
Bissau and identify ways to revitalize it. Two months
later a validation meeting was organized, in collabor-
ation with the West African Health Organization, where
a draft of a new community health policy, based on
the ﬁrst meeting, was presented and discussed by
stakeholders.
In the ﬁrst meeting, four international NGOs, i.e. AMI,
VIDA, ACPP and Saúde em Português, as well as Eﬀective
Intervention gave brief presentations of their projects
and experiences with community healthcare. A represen-
tative from one FBO, Caritas, also participated in the
meeting but did not present its work in community
healthcare. From the presentations, it became clear
that the implementation of community healthcare
varied considerably between diﬀerent actors. Thus, the
importance of harmonization was emphasized in both
meetings. The Ministry of Health no longer wanted
diﬀerent actors to implement community healthcare in
the way that each actor found suitable; they wanted to
have more of a say in the implementation process and
have a more uniform strategy.
In an interview after the validation meeting, a senior
oﬃcial of the Ministry of Health said that the Ministry
should work according to the Paris Declaration on Aid
Eﬀectiveness; based on that, he argued, it was time to
harmonize the activities of the actors that worked in
community healthcare. He claimed that there had been
some problems with the collaboration between NGOs
and the Ministry, as the system was disorganized and
each NGO had its own way of acting. This, the senior
oﬃcial said, was one of the reasons why the Ministry
had organized the two stakeholder meetings:
The partners can come from where they come from, but
when they come here they have to follow our directives,
these are the activities that they should implement in
community healthcare in the terrain. I believe we have
now deﬁned it, we have decided the way that we
should all follow when it comes to interventions on the
community level. Regarding funding, I can say that it
was working well, but regarding organization, it was
not working well.2
The Ministry of Health was trying to organize itself better
and have a better overview of what all actors in commu-
nity healthcare were doing, how they were doing it and
with what funds, the senior ofﬁcial explained, and he
added:
We are asking them to elaborate projects together with
the Ministry of Health because many times projects are
elaborated abroad, they submit them only to get
approval, and we can only do small changes. After they
are approved and they have gotten the funding we
cannot change it. We are in need of assistance, so we
have to accept it. But we believe now it is the time to
change that.3
Now, he stated, the Ministry of Health believed the time
was ripe for all stakeholders to collaborate and for every-
one to follow the Ministry’s directives on community
healthcare that they had all elaborated together. Never-
theless, the ﬁnal policy document was also under the
inﬂuence of global health policy and did not take into
account some important decisions made by
stakeholders.
The international stakeholders were positive about
the stakeholder meetings and found it essential to
work out a new policy to improve community healthcare.
As an NGO representative said after the validation
meeting: ‘It was a good and important initiative on
behalf of the Ministry of Health to invite all stakeholders
to participate in the elaboration of a new policy right
from the onset.’ Nonetheless, there were certain
aspects of the stakeholder meetings that led to concerns
and annoyances on behalf of some of the NGO represen-
tatives. In interviews after the meetings, some of them
argued that the Ministry of Health had exaggerated the
problems with the NGOs. One international NGO
worker did not agree with the criticism of the Ministry
of Health and argued that the NGOs were not all
working in the same places:
The NGOs are not united, and everyone wants to have
their part here and their part there, but I think that
they [Ministry of Health] should see NGOs with better
eyes because we are a help to them but they don’t
understand it.
Then, the NGO representative complained: ‘They [the
Ministry] are always criticizing.’ Once the Ministry of
Health started to implement the new community
health policy, the annoyances from the NGO-side
intensiﬁed.
Times of tension
After the stakeholder meetings, the diﬀerent NGOs
started to wonder how their projects would ﬁt within
the new community health policy. Although the NGOs
had participated in the elaboration of the new policy,
some NGO workers did not know how to proceed with
their projects and became confused about the future
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role of the NGOs. One NGO worker pointed out that they
had focused on the construction and equipment of
village health units. These were no longer an important
part of community healthcare, as CHWs were now to
do home visits with a focus on prevention, not treatment.
Other NGO workers wondered how to proceed with the
planned training of CHWs and TBAs. An NGO worker
explained that a Ministry of Health oﬃcial had recently
informed him that his NGO was no longer to continue
with training, as new CHWs were to be selected and
trained by the Ministry. Although the NGO worker
claimed he supported the new policy, he argued the
change was too rapid, and there was limited time for
adjustment, or as he put it:
They just changed the direction in one week, and we
were doing that kind of work, and now we are not
doing that, and there was no talking [about it]… they
are not saying okay come with us and let’s try to pass
the information and the things that you were doing
and the things that we want to do; I don’t know, I
really don’t know.4
Due to the rapid change, the NGO worker argued: ‘It is
good that our project is not only about health and com-
munity healthcare, now if it was like that we had no work
anymore because that part is completely out of our
project.’
One and a half year after the validation meeting, at
least two of the NGOs, which had presented their pro-
jects at the Days of Reﬂection meeting, had stopped
working with community healthcare as a direct result
of the new policy. The representatives of the NGOs
argued that although they had participated in the policy-
making process, the Ministry of Health had not collabo-
rated with them as planned once the new policy was
approved. The same applied to a third NGO that had
been training TBAs in one of the regions but did not par-
ticipate in the stakeholder meetings. The Ministry of
Health had contacted these three NGOs speciﬁcally
and told them to stop their activities, as they did not
align with the new policy. The Ministry of Health
informed that TBAs had been excluded from the commu-
nity health program; instead, CHWs were to refer all
pregnant women to health facilities for antenatal care
and deliveries. However, six months after the military
coup that took place on 12 April 2012, the Ministry was
starting to realize that it had chased away some NGOs
working in community healthcare. Consequently, one
NGO representative said that a Ministry oﬃcial had con-
tacted the NGO and informed that they wanted them to
restart their work at the community level. The renewed
interest in collaborating with NGOs was apparently
fuelled by the change in the political climate after the
coup.
Political crisis and donor dilemmas
The public health sector was severely aﬀected by the
military coup. The whole country went on hold, and
the Ministry of Health was closed for about two
months. The planned health activities within the Ministry
were postponed, as there was no money available and
no minister to sign the cheques for implementing the
activities. The donors, upon whom Guinea-Bissau were
dependent, did not know at ﬁrst how to react to the
coup. An international actor explained:
There was one big issue at this moment… a lot of
money was given [by donors before the coup], and the
biggest fear was that this money would disappear
[from the bank]. The bank blocked all accounts, so every-
thing was blocked; all the implementation was blocked.
Then came the need to work with NGOs, and even
with things that NGOs weren’t really used to work with.5
Time passed and after two months a transitional govern-
ment took ofﬁce. However, most international donors
did not ofﬁcially accept the new government, which
resulted in strained relationships between the govern-
ment and donors; many donors decided to withdraw
their assistance and left the country. The majority of
the organizations that continued to work in Guinea-
Bissau, such as the EU and WHO, suspended institutional
cooperation with the government and put support for
speciﬁc projects on hold. However, direct support to
the people and civil society continued through NGOs,
which, in turn, collaborated with the Ministry of Health
at the regional level. A representative from the donors
said that he did not think the government had any
problem with this strategy: ‘At least we work with them
at the regional level.’
The Global Fund, which was one of the most important
donors before the coup, practically suspended its assist-
ance directly after the coup. It did, however, resume
work in December 2012, but with changes; now it was
going to collaborate with a ﬁduciary agency. Also, it
reduced funding and only ﬁnanced activities that were
directly related to the treatment of patients, i.e. practically
only the delivery of drugs. The Fund’s suspension after the
coup had negative eﬀects on the healthcare system, as a
senior Ministry oﬃcial argued, the healthcare system was
strongly dependent on external assistance, and the Global
Fund was one of the largest donors:
The country does not buy drugs. It is given drugs [by its
donors]. We are dependent on donations, if you do not
behave well, then the donations will not come, and
when it does not come we have problems with
healthcare.6
So, because of donor withdrawals, there was a disruption
in supplies of medicine for HIV, malaria and tuberculosis.
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Some of the drugs had, however, gone to the private
market where they were sold at high prices. The Ministry
of Health had tried to solve the problem by borrowing
medicine for tuberculosis for two months from
Senegal, but these were immediately used up. UNICEF
had also bought medicines to cover the demand for
two months.
With the appointment of a transitional government,
the Ministry of Health resumed its activities but not to
the same extent as before the military coup because
they had lost many of their partners. Eight months
after the coup, a senior oﬃcial at the Ministry explained:
‘We had partners that we were in dialogue with, and that
has reduced. We have partners that have withdrawn
their assistance, and we have others that have sus-
pended it.’ He took the national hospital Simão
Mendes as an example; after construction of the new
pavilions was completed the hospital was to be
equipped with money from the African Development
Bank. ‘Furniture had been ordered when the coup took
place, but they cancelled everything, which means that
we cannot open these pavilions,’ he conﬁrmed and
added:
The Embassy of Spain withdrew from Guinea-Bissau, they
left immediately, they were our main collaborators in the
area of health. There are a lot of partners that we lost, we
lost some EU projects that were withdrawn, and they
continued with others.7
Apart from the suspension of funds, international
organizations and donors were no longer allowed by
their headquarters to collaborate with the Ministry of
Health, which complicated the work of the Ministry
further. The senior oﬃcial found it diﬃcult to continue
his work when donors were not able to discuss with
him as a partner. He argued that this situation had, in
fact, aﬀected the implementation of the community
health program, as the Ministry could not ﬁnd partners
to help it implement the project: ‘If we had not been in
that situation we could have found many partners, like
UNICEF and other partners. These could mobilize more
partners and the Ministry itself could have mobilized
more partners around this [project].’ Due to the political
situation, he explained, the Ministry could not mobilize
resources ‘because you have partners with whom you
are unable to talk.’
Because of the political situation, the Ministry of
Health lost much of its power, while the NGOs strength-
ened their position. Local and foreign donor representa-
tives and NGO workers as well as Ministry oﬃcials and
health professionals tended to see the bypassing of the
Ministry of Health as necessary but unfortunate and
argued for the importance of alignment, harmonization
and ownership. For instance, some Ministry representa-
tives found that donors were obliged to respond in this
way, and one oﬃcial argued: ‘Donors took these
measures because they did not trust the government
and they were scared that their money would not go
to what it was intended for.’ He explained that in case
the government would need to resolve some issues
urgently they might take the funds, and then be
unable to implement the activities for which the
money was intended:
That is why they [donors] prefer NGOs, they will not
touch the money. The State, on the other hand, could
say we will take it [the funds] and later on we will
return it. [Later] they will not be able to return the
money, and the activities stop.8
The Ministry oﬃcial could understand donors when it
came to collaborating with NGOs because ‘whenever
there is a project, the work goes well because they
have enough [funds] to do their work. Always when
you are on a project, you want the project to go well,
you do not want it to fail.’
There were some who argued ﬁrmly against bypass-
ing the Ministry. A representative of an international
organization did not agree with the increased reliance
on NGOs and explained that use of NGOs had resulted
in delays in implementing projects for his agency and
others. The representative explained:
We had diﬃculties to implement our program because
we were told that we couldn’t work together with the
government. We have to work together with NGOs and
the population; it became a little bit complicated. It
does not facilitate our implementation and our
program for the Millennium Development Goals.9
The representative was critical of the fact that
NGOs were taking over the government’s role in
implementing activities. When collaborating with
international NGOs, ‘you have to pay money that
could have been used to implement more activities.’
As an example, the money could have been used
for ﬁve activities, but now it would only cover three,
as the rest of the money would go to cover the
cost of the NGO. Therefore, the representative found
it better and more eﬃcient if the money would go
straight through the government to the people.
There were also local NGO workers who worried
about the increased reliance on NGOs and stressed
the importance of collaborating with the Ministry of
Health. They argued that the Ministry had more tech-
nical capacity in healthcare than they did, and worried
it could complicate the situation to sidestep the Min-
istry, claiming that the principal structure responsible
for health is the government.
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The increased focus on NGOs was noticeable in the
implementation of the new directives for community
healthcare. In June 2012, UNICEF started a pilot project
in one of the regions to implement the directives of
the new community health policy. UNICEF decided to
collaborate with an international NGO that had worked
with PHC projects in the region since 1998. The NGO par-
ticipated in elaborating a project document together
with UNICEF, in consultation with the regional health
board. UNICEF ﬁnanced the project while the NGO
implemented it in collaboration with the regional
health board. The project duration was to be one year;
if successful the plan was to implement it in other
regions of the country.
UNICEF argued that the political situation in the
country was not the main reason for collaborating with
an NGO. A UNICEF representative explained that they
had realized that the workload of nurses at the health
centres was already too high. The nurses had responsibil-
ities and could not close; someone needed to be there at
all times to carry out consultations, vaccinate children
and do antenatal care. The nurses also had to do out-
reach activities to villages situated further than ﬁve kilo-
meters from the health centres. Thus, the UNICEF
representative argued, it was diﬃcult for health centres
to manage all this work and on top of that supervise all
the CHWs in their health districts. In contrast, the NGOs
only have their projects to implement and do not have
other activities that can aﬀect their performance. Thus,
UNICEF had decided that it was best to collaborate
with NGOs. Yet, it had been decided at the stakeholder
meetings at the Ministry of Health, that the health
centres, rather than the NGOs, should be the main
actors in the implementation of the new community
health policy. The UNICEF representative recognized
this fact, but argued:
At the time of the Days of Reﬂection, we thought that
in reality health centres could do it. But, the truth is
that if you look at the outreach strategies, if you
give money for these activities, they are not done
because the nurse says that he does not have the
time; he has a motorcycle, he has gasoline, and he
has everything [to complete the work]. People associ-
ate these political aspects with it [the fact that they
started to collaborate with an NGO] but even
though the political situation [remained the same] it
does not aﬀect our perception of who is the best at
assisting CHWs.10
The UNICEF representative pointed out that the
organization was not allowed to collaborate with the
Ministry of Health with funding from EU. Instead,
UNICEF was to collaborate with the Ministry at the
regional level.
Many actors, national and international, were worried
about the sustainability of the revitalized community
healthcare strategy. This applied in particular to Bissau-
Guinean health professionals for whom cuts in support
were not a new phenomenon. They worried about what
would happen once funding was over. Paying the CHWs
was of particular concern, or as one health oﬃcial
argued: ‘That is why many things fail because they
[CHWs] get used to receiving money when you [NGOs]
are there, but it creates problems when you no longer
have money to give them.’ Once the project stops, the
health oﬃcial argued, CHWs would refuse to continue
their work. In contrast, an NGO representative argued
that in a way the project would be sustainable, as it
would lead to changed healthcare seeking behavior by
the community that would last beyond the project. A few
interviewees argued that giving priority to sustainability
over immediate actionwasnot ethical; one shouldmitigate
human suﬀering and the needless death of people.
Discussion
In response to the international call for increased empha-
sis on PHC in the spirit of Alma Ata, in 2010 the Ministry
of Health in Guinea-Bissau took its ﬁrst steps to revitalize
the once promising and well-received community-based
PHC services (Baldursdóttir 2018). Important partners
were international organizations and NGOs that at the
time worked within the sector but in an uncoordinated
and ad-hoc manner. The Ministry of Health emphasized
ownership, harmonization and alignment of the commu-
nity healthcare services in line with the Paris Declaration,
which some NGOs received with mixed feelings. Some
NGOs stayed on while others became engaged in new
activities. As a result of political instability, compounded
by a military coup in 2012, suddenly the NGOs became
central to the implementation of the community health
services when most donors decided to bypass the Minis-
try of Health.
The observed bypassing of the Ministry of Health
through the use of NGOs reﬂects donors’ practice in
fragile states (Acht, Mahmoud, and Thiele 2014; Dietrich
2013; Gutting and Steinwand 2017). Although there are
some positive aspects of collaborating with NGOs,
there are challenges (Banks and Hulme 2012; Banks,
Hulme, and Edwards 2015; Buse and Walt 1996; Doyle
and Patel 2008; Gideon and Porter 2016; Hearn 1998,
2007; Pfeiﬀer 2003). The pros and cons of the NGO-
ization of revitalized community healthcare in Guinea-
Bissau listed by donor representatives, NGO workers,
Ministry oﬃcials and local health professionals are
already recognized in the literature. NGOs, both national
and international, tend to work on short-term projects
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and to manage these on behalf of their donors rather
than the national authorities (Chilundo et al. 2015;
Hearn 2007; Pfeiﬀer 2003). Some of the NGOs active in
community healthcare in Guinea-Bissau felt that even
though they had participated in the elaboration of the
new national policy it did not align with their projects.
Thus, they were resistant to follow the policy and
instead opted for other activities.
Although most actors found the bypassing of the Min-
istry of Health regrettable, they understood that the
donors shied away from collaboration with the govern-
ment to protect their funds and to secure eﬀective
implementation. Local health professionals and Ministry
oﬃcials argued however that NGOs, owing to their
access to resources rather than competence, were in
general more eﬀective than state actors. All actors
agreed that local professionals were to be involved in
the implementation of the activities to enhance capacity
building and sustainability. At the same time, there were
some actors, national and international ones, who were
against increased NGO-ization and they were concerned
that bypassing the government might hamper align-
ment, harmonization and ownership as reﬂected in the
donor dilemmas described by Dietrich (2016, 2013).
In Guinea-Bissau, UNICEF opted for the NGO-ization of
its support to the community health services. This
occurred also with the EU-funded scale up of the
UNICEF pilot project that had aimed, with some
success, to reduce the high maternal and infant mortality
rates (Dominguez 2017). An argument for this focus on
NGOs was the given assumption that the local health
center staﬀ lacked the time to take on the extra work
associated with introducing of the new community
health policy. Human resources are indeed a limited
resource (Russo et al. 2017), but health staﬀ have the
closest collaboration with the CHWs as well as knowl-
edge of health-related issues and how to work with the
communities. Also, Pfeiﬀer (2003) points out, the
achievements in community health projects can disap-
pear once the involved NGOs depart as most local staﬀ
lack adequate training and local health institutions lack
resources. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Witter
et al. (2017) from post-conﬂict settings, which shows
that the health system was not able to sustain health
staﬀ whose salaries had previously been paid by NGOs.
A study from Mozambique by Chilundo et al. (2015)
shows that dependency on donors and NGOs can be
problematic for revitalized CHW programs, and could
counteract sustainability.
Considering the political instability of Guinea-Bissau,
its aid dependency and lack of local resources, the sus-
tainability aspect is relevant. Most national and foreign
participants in this research agreed that bypassing the
Ministry with NGO-ization would counteract sustainabil-
ity, understood as the continuation of community
healthcare in the long run. Throughout their professional
lives, Ministry oﬃcials and health professionals had
experienced cuts in aid and abrupt changes in donor pri-
orities (Einarsdóttir and Gunnlaugsson 2005). In line with
Radelet (2004), aid to Guinea-Bissau tended to be unpre-
dictable and short-term, and the NGO-ization did not sur-
prise them. They were worried about the continuation of
support when community healthcare was no longer high
on the global health agenda and NGOs wind down their
assistance and turn to other business. Having in mind the
experience of aid dependency and the degradation of
community healthcare after the departure of donors at
the turn of the century (Baldursdóttir 2018), the new
policy of paid CHWs was not seen to facilitate retention
after withdrawal of support. Two additional arguments
about sustainability emerged. The ﬁrst, an NGO argu-
ment, underlines that a revitalized community health
program would be sustainable through improved com-
munity health knowledge which would remain with
the population in the rural villages, despite withdrawal.
The second argument questions whether all health
activities need to be sustainable, as the fundamental
idea is to save lives. For Swidler and Watkins (2009) the
idea of sustainability is a self-delusion for funders who
should instead determine what projects are eﬀective
and then sustain them.
Donors truly face a dilemma in a situation of state fra-
gility, but there is now an increased emphasis on donor
engagement in the world’s poorest and most fragile
states (Acht, Mahmoud, and Thiele 2014, 2015; Dietrich
2016, 2013). Research has shown that avoidance to
support fragile states may contribute to increased
instability in countries otherwise judged to be unworthy
of aid (Einarsdóttir and Gunnlaugsson 2016; McGillvray
2006; Nielsen et al. 2011). Einarsdóttir and Gunnlaugsson
(2016) argue that the merit-based allocation of aid
ignores the dire conditions of populations suﬀering
both from bad governance and the non-engagement
of donors. Allocation of aid is therefore an ethical endea-
vor that should ﬁrst of all be need-based.
In line with the ﬁndings of Chabot and Waddington
(1987), we argue that the implementation of commu-
nity-based PHC projects is not a cheap option to solve
the healthcare needs of poor, rural populations in low-
income countries. In health, Dodd and Lane (2010)
point out, the provision of donor assistance needs to
be long-term and predictable, as most costs are recur-
rent. Without sustainable community healthcare, sub-
stantial resources through global solidarity, enduring
involvement and persistence, Alma Ata’s original aim,
‘Health-for-All,’ will not be realized.
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Conclusion
The healthcare services in Guinea-Bissau rank among the
worst in the world in terms of access and quality. In such
a situation, community-based PHC can play an important
role to give the mostly rural population at least minimal
access to services, and there have been innovative initiat-
ives to achieve this taken over the years. Guinea-Bissau is
aid-dependent, and international trends and policies are
compounded by political instability. The ﬁndings pre-
sented illustrate the complexity of the relationship
between NGOs and Ministry oﬃcials in such a setting.
In line with Hearn’s (2007) reasoning, the NGOs,
whether national or international, became more like
managers of foreign development projects than promo-
ters of national development.
Notes
1. See for example: Atkinson et al. 2001; Bernard 2006;
Hammersley and Atkinson 2007; Crang and Cook 2007;
Davies 1999.
2. Interview with a Ministry of Health oﬃcial, 12 January
2011.
3. Idem.
4. Interview with a NGO worker, 21 February 2011.
5. Interview with an international actor, 17 November 2012.
6. Interview with a Ministry of Health oﬃcial, 16 November
2012.
7. Idem.
8. Interview with a Ministry of Health oﬃcial, 18 December
2012.
9. Interview with a representative of an international organ-
ization, 4 December 2012.
10. Interview with a UNICEF representative, 14 December
2012.
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